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Emerging evidence is now challenging the view that patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia experience a selective deficit in their sense of agency. Additional
disturbances seem to exist in their sense of body ownership. However, the factors
underlying this disturbance in body ownership remain elusive. Knowledge of these
factors, and increased understanding of how body ownership is related to other
abnormalities seen in schizophrenia, could ultimately advance development of new
treatments. Research on body ownership in schizophrenia has mainly been investigated
with the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Schizophrenia patients show higher susceptibility to
the RHI, which may be explained by a stronger reliance on multisensory information
over weaker stored body representations. This review shows that a coherent sense of
body ownership arises from the integration of both bottom-up sensory processes and
higher order, top-down bodily- and perceptual representations. Multisensory integration,
temporal binding, anticipation, intention and efferent signals all partly modulate the
complex experience of body ownership. Specifically, we propose that patients with
schizophrenia have weaker stored body representations, and rely to a greater extent
on external stimuli, such as visual information, due to imprecise or highly variable
internal predictions. Moreover, the reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia may
additionally contribute to the disturbed sense of body ownership, as evidence from
healthy participants suggests that agency and body ownership are interrelated. Vice
versa, a reduced sense of body ownership may also contribute to a reduced sense of
agency. Future studies should explicitly target the precise relationship between the two
in schizophrenia.
Keywords: body ownership, self-agency, schizophrenia, multisensory integration, body representations, internal
predictions, temporal binding
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is described as a psychiatric disorder in which there is loss of coherence in the
minimal sense of self (Nelson et al., 2014). From a phenomenological perspective, three layers in
the sense of self are distinguished (Sass and Parnas, 2003). At the first and most basic level, there
is an implicit and unconscious awareness of oneself as an origin of experience, as a medium for
relating to the world, referred to the ‘‘minimal self’’ or ipseity. Secondly, a more explicit or reflective
awareness of the self exists as a constant subject of experience and action. Finally, the ‘‘social’’ or
‘‘narrative self’’ refers to personal characteristics such as habits, social identity and history, and often
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involves reflective, metacognitive processes (Nelson et al., 2014).
These different levels of self-experience are interconnected and
cannot be observed in isolation from each other.
Different authors have stated that the most basic level of
self-experience, ipseity, is rooted in the bodily experience (e.g.,
Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Piaget, 1954). The sense of one’s own
body is variously termed ‘‘corporeal awareness’’, ‘‘bodily self-
consciousness’’, or ‘‘embodiment’’, and is described as an implicit
form of knowledge that is both non-conceptual and somatic
(Kant and Smith, 2003). Embodiment specifically is defined as
‘‘the perception that one’s sense of self is localized within one’s
bodily borders’’ (Arzy et al., 2006). Some authors have proposed
that this embodiment is a necessary prerequisite for other kinds
of self-experience (e.g., Kant and Smith, 2003). According to the
phenomenological approach, the coherence between the diverse
symptoms in schizophrenia can only be understood if their
shared bodily roots are taken into account (de Haan and Fuchs,
2010).
The embodied sense of self is a complex phenomenon that
consists of different components, including body ownership and
the sense of agency over actions. In this review, we adopt a
broad definition of body ownership conceived by Tsakiris et al.
(2007) as ‘‘the special perceptual status of one’s own body, which
makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself’’. In healthy
people, a sense of body ownership is continuously present
and they therefore experience body ownership not only when
performing intended actions, but also when resting and during
passive movement. The sense of agency, on the other hand, is
the perception that one is the initiator of one’s actions. The
observation that people with schizophrenia often misattribute
their own actions to someone or something else, or deny
intending their actions, has led to the prevailing idea that there
is a selective impairment in their sense of agency, while body
ownership is thought to be intact.
This prevalent view, in which patients with schizophrenia
have a disturbed sense of agency but a normal sense of
body ownership, has caused research to focus on motor
control processes. To date, only few studies have specifically
examined body ownership in schizophrenia, mainly with the
use of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm, first described
by Botvinick and Cohen (1998). During this illusion, the
participant’s hand is hidden from view whilst a rubber model
hand is placed in front of him. The experimenter simultaneously
strokes the rubber hand and the participant’s hidden hand
with two brushes. This produces an illusory sensation of
ownership over the rubber hand and a shift in perceived
hand location toward the fake hand (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998).
This RHI is generally experienced more intensely in people
with schizophrenia (Peled et al., 2000, 2003; Thakkar et al.,
2011; Germine et al., 2013). This finding challenges the idea that
people with schizophrenia have a selective deficit in sense of
agency. Additional disturbances in the sense of body ownership
seem to exist. However, the underlying factors contributing
to a disturbed sense of body ownership in schizophrenia
are not clear. We will therefore review current evidence,
and examine which factors contribute to a disturbed sense
of body ownership in people diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Specific studies and experiments that have contributed to an
increased understanding of bodily experience will be highlighted.
Finally, the connection between agency and ownership will be
investigated. A summary of the possible factors underlying a
disturbed sense of body ownership in schizophrenia is included
in Table 1. Knowledge on how body ownership is related to
other types of self-experience and psychosis-proneness can help
increase our understanding of factors that lead to psychosis
development and could ultimately advance development of new
treatments.
MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION
Multisensory integration involves the processing of sensory
input from various modalities and the resolution of possible
conflicts in order to represent the body and the world coherently.
Body ownership specifically is thought to result from the
integration of visual and proprioceptive signals (Giummarra
et al., 2008). The RHI depends on an interaction between
sensory inputs from three different modalities, namely vision,
touch, and proprioception. In this paradigm, a distorted
sense of body ownership can be elicited by inducing a
sensory conflict. Seeing the tactile stimulation on the rubber
hand, while simultaneously feeling this on one’s own hand,
results in a visual capture of the tactile sensation which
subsequently causes a feeling of relocalization of one’s own
hand towards the location of the rubber hand. This is
termed ‘‘proprioceptive drift’’ and is thought to result from
the dominance of vision over proprioception (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998). Using a psychometric approach with principal
component analysis, Longo et al. (2008) found four dissociable
components of the RHI experience, namely embodiment of
the rubber hand, loss of the own hand, movement, and affect.
Embodiment could in turn be separated into the three tightly
interacting components of agency, ownership and location.
Ownership specifically correlated with proprioceptive drift
(Longo et al., 2008). This is in line with results obtained
by Holmes et al. (2006), who found that proprioceptive
bias correlated to questionnaire items investigating specifically
ownership, but not other types of questions (Holmes et al.,
2006).
Strength of the RHI has traditionally been measured in
three ways, namely with the use of introspective questionnaires,
proprioceptive drift and skin conductance response elicited
by threatening or injuring the rubber hand. Statements on a
questionnaire cannot be used to quantify the illusion in absolute
terms, but should rather be used to measure differences between
conditions. Indirect measurementmay allow bypassing problems
that are inherent to quantification of subjective experience such
as suggestion, variability due to beliefs and top-down influences
(Rohde et al., 2011). Proprioceptive drift has been reported
to correlate with the subjective feeling of ownership over the
rubber hand (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008;
Lopez et al., 2010). This drift has been widely used as a proxy
for the subjective feeling of ownership. However, recent studies
indicate that a dissociation between subjective ratings and drift
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exists (e.g., Shimada et al., 2009; Rohde et al., 2011; Romano
et al., 2015). This dissociation implies that conclusions about
the experience of ownership cannot be drawn from measuring
proprioceptive drift alone. There is more or less a consensus in
the field that objective measures such as proprioceptive drift or
skin conductance response should be combined with subjective
ratings (Rohde et al., 2011; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Asai,
2015).
Originally, Botvinick and Cohen (1998) proposed a bottom-
up explanation of the RHI which suggests that synchronized
tactile and visual stimulation are needed for the illusion to
occur, since the illusion was not elicited with the use of
asynchronous stimulation (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson
et al., 2004). However, intermodal matching of tactile and visual
information does not seem sufficient to generate an experience
of body ownership. Most studies use a rubber hand that visually
corresponds to a human hand in shape, color and texture.
If synchronous multisensory stimulation is the single factor
causing body ownership, then it should be possible to induce
ownership over objects that do not visually resemble a limb.
Studies show that the illusion is not elicited when a neutral
object such as a wooden plank is used instead of a rubber
hand (Haggard, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006; Haans et al., 2008;
Tsakiris et al., 2008, 2010b). Armel and Ramachandran (2003)
report that a sense of ownership can be elicited over a table to
some extent, but significantly less than over a rubber hand as
measured by intensity ratings and skin conductance response
(Armel and Ramachandran, 2003). Instead, a (partial) visual
match between the object and the subject’s hand is usually needed
for body ownership over the artificial hand. Also, the sense of
body ownership is diminished when the rubber hand is of a
different laterality or is placed in an incongruent anatomical
posture in relation to the subject’s own hand (Pavani et al., 2000;
Tsakiris et al., 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007). Apart from
visual and postural congruence, spatial proximity (<30 cm) is
another necessary condition for the illusion to occur (Lloyd,
2007).
When active control over objects is involved, however, people
may experience some sense of ownership over non-corporeal
objects. Ma and Hommel (2015) designed a virtual reality set-
up, in which people could actively manipulate movement, size
and color of either a virtual balloon or square. Participants
reported a sense of ownership over the virtual effectors to some
extent. The finding that people can experience ownership over
non-corporeal objects would provide support for bottom-up
approaches of self-representation (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
Integration of temporally and spatially congruent multisensory
signals would then be sufficient to induce the illusion of body
ownership. However, the results of Ma and Hommel (2015)
should be interpreted with caution, since participants reported
low ownership ratings. Moreover, the ownership illusion was
more convincing when the virtual effectors seemed to be
connected to the participant’s body, suggesting that Gestalt
principles influence self-perception. These Gestalt principles
indicate that connectedness, governed by the laws of proximity
and continuity, is central to perceiving unity (Ellis, 1999). Studies
by Newport and Preston (2010) and Tieri et al. (2015) indeed
show that virtually detaching the hand or finger in virtual reality,
thereby disrupting continuity, abolishes body ownership of the
proxy hand completely (Newport and Preston, 2010; Tieri et al.,
2015).
These studies suggest that integration of visual, tactile, and
proprioceptive information mediates ownership of single limbs.
Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) investigated how ownership of
individual body parts translates into the experience of owning
a whole body. They used a ‘‘‘body-swap’’’ illusion, in which
people experienced a virtual body to be their own through visuo-
tactile stimulation. Their findings suggest that the experience
of owning an entire body is produced by neuronal populations
that integrate multisensory information across body segments
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). In a following study, Petkova et al.
(2011) found that the first person visual perspective poses a
fundamental constraint on the full-body illusion. This supports
the proposed model that the sense of body ownership relies
on mechanisms for multisensory integration operating in body-
part-centered reference frames (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al.,
2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).
Patients with schizophrenia have been shown to experience
the RHI more strongly (Peled et al., 2003) and faster (Peled
et al., 2000) compared to healthy controls, as indicated
by self-report questionnaires. These results have generally
been explained as a decreased sense of body ownership, or
less distinct self-other perception in schizophrenia due to
deficits in multisensory integration. However, these studies
used introspective reports (questionnaires) for both diagnosing
schizophrenia and strength of the illusion, and the results
could therefore merely reflect a response bias. Also, the
study conducted by Peled et al. (2000) lacked a control
condition. A possible general tendency to endorse bodily
sensations in people with schizophrenia can therefore not be
excluded.
In another study, Thakkar et al. (2011) investigated the RHI in
schizophrenic patients compared to healthy controls with the use
of both subjective (questionnaire) and objective (proprioceptive
drift, autonomic response) measurements. Experience of the
RHI was stronger during synchronous stimulation in both
healthy controls and patients, indicated by both self-report
and proprioceptive drift. Moreover, people with schizophrenia
reported a stronger RHI than controls. In regard to the
objective measures, Thakkar et al. (2011) found a larger
proprioceptive drift in patients, but only with synchronous
stimulation. This may indicate that proprioceptive drift and
introspective reports represent distinct aspects of the illusion
or that one of the measures does not adequately capture
strength of experiencing the RHI (see Holmes et al., 2006;
Shimada et al., 2009; Rohde et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2015).
Another finding of the study is that temperature dropped in
the stimulated hand during right hand stimulation whereas it
increased in the unstimulated hand. Altogether, the authors
conclude embodiment of the RHI to be stronger in schizophrenic
patients than in healthy controls, in agreement with previous
investigations (Peled et al., 2000, 2003). Psychosis-like symptoms
in otherwise healthy individuals were correlated to greater
illusion susceptibility/strength of body ownership in the RHI
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 305
Klaver and Dijkerman Body Ownership Aberrances in Schizophrenia
TABLE 1 | The different factors possibly underlying a disturbed sense of body ownership in schizophrenia.
Factor Literature
Multisensory integration A stronger effect of visual information overriding
weaker multisensory integration.
Peled et al. (2000, 2003), Asai et al. (2011), Thakkar
et al. (2011) and Germine et al. (2013)
Temporal and intentional binding A “longer” window of temporal binding, in which
events that happen further away in time are experienced as
co-occurring.
Elvevåg et al. (2003), Franck et al. (2005), Foucher
et al. (2007) and Graham et al. (2014)
Predictive mechanisms and anticipation More variable predictive mechanisms resulting in a
higher reliance on external information such as vision.
Ross et al. (2000), Voss et al. (2010), Lalanne et al.
(2012) and Ferri et al. (2014)
Efferent motor signals Aberrant efferent signals possibly leading to a
more flexible sense of body ownership and higher
interference of external information on the self.
Malenka et al. (1982), Frith and Done (1989), Daprati
et al. (1997), Blakemore et al. (2000, 2002), Shergill
et al. (2005) and Synofzik et al. (2010)
Self-agency Agency and ownership are dissociable components
of self-experience, but they do seem to interact. The
disturbed sense of agency may therefore contribute to
a disturbed sense of ownership in schizophrenia.
Tsakiris et al. (2006, 2010a), Longo et al. (2008),
Waters and Badcock (2010), Kalckert and Ehrsson
(2012, 2014), Asai (2015), Louzolo et al. (2015), and
Garbarini et al. (2016)
Only research specifically targeted at schizophrenia patients is included except for self agency, in which also evidence from healthy individuals is taken into account.
with synchronous stimulation in a study conducted by Germine
et al. (2013).
The RHI is thought to arise from multisensory (visual and
tactile) information overruling stored body representations
(Tsakiris, 2010). Following this, stronger experience of the
illusion could either result from increased multisensory
integration, a stronger reliance on visual cues overriding
proprioceptive information, or weaker pre-existing body
representations. Previous research demonstrates that being
prone to psychosis is related to a decrease in multisensory
integration, as opposed to an increase (e.g., Asai et al., 2011;
Germine et al., 2013). This makes increased visual-tactile
integration a less likely explanation for the abovementioned
findings. Rather, this can be interpreted for support of
the hypothesis of weaker stored body or somatosensory
representations. Previous studies have indeed already indicated
that cognitive and perceptual deficits in schizophrenia are due
to inadequate coupling of sensory information to pre-existing
representations and environmental context, the details of
which are beyond the scope of this review (but see: Schneider
et al., 2002; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Higher susceptibility
to the illusion may therefore be due to a stronger reliance on
multisensory information over potentially weaker stored body
representations.
In conclusion, these studies indicate that simultaneous
intermodal stimulation is necessary, but not sufficient for a sense
of ownership to occur in the RHI. Spatial proximity, visual
resemblance and postural correspondence are also important in
eliciting a sense of body-ownership.When active manipulation is
involved however, these prerequisites are attenuated, suggesting
that a sense of agency may be important for a sense of
body ownership to occur. This provides some support for
the hypothesis of Short and Ward (2009), who postulate that
ownership can be experienced over any object, irrespective
of visual appearance, if predictable action outcomes follow
the intentions of the agent (Short and Ward, 2009). In the
absence of direct control, however, other factors, such as visual
resemblance, spatial proximity and postural correspondencemay
become more important. With respect to schizophrenia, studies
with the RHI suggest an enhanced illusion. While multisensory
integration seems to be impaired in schizophrenia, this is likely
to result in a reduced rather than increased RHI. Therefore,
factors other than bottom-up multisensory processes, such as
a weakened stored body representation, may contribute to a
disturbed sense of body ownership.
TEMPORAL AND INTENTIONAL BINDING
Multisensory integration is generally seen as a crucial component
in coherent bodily self-experience and sense of body ownership.
As discussed above, disturbances in sensory processing that
involve multisensory integration have been shown to exist in
people with schizophrenia. However, other factors seem to play
a role. Recent studies have investigated the temporal factors
important for multisensory integration, with a focus on the
‘‘temporal binding window’’, which is defined as the timespan
within which stimuli from different modalities are perceptually
bound. These studies have demonstrated that the window of
temporal binding is distorted in various neurodevelopmental
disorders, such as autism, dyslexia and schizophrenia. For
example, Graham et al. (2014) investigated body ownership in
schizophrenia patients divided into three groups, namely patients
with current, past, and no history of passivity symptoms. They
used a projected-hand illusion, in which a live video image of
the participant’s hand is projected onto a video screen, with the
real hand and the image of the hand being separated by 15 cm.
Two delay conditions were present in the illusion; synchronous
(<10 ms video delay) and asynchronous (an additional imposed
500 ms delay) feedback. A remarkable finding is that patients
in the subgroup with current passivity symptoms did not
show the typical reduction in body illusion with asynchronous
feedback (with a 500 ms delay in visual feedback) as opposed
to the synchronous condition. So, the clinical subgroup with
passivity symptoms continued to experience ownership over
the projected hand during asynchronous stimulation, whereas
the other subgroups did not retain the sense of ownership in
this condition (Graham et al., 2014). This may suggest that
the window of temporal binding, which provides connections
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between the self and external stimuli, is ‘‘wider’’ in patients
with current passivity symptoms. Consequently, they experience
stimuli that are further apart in time, as co-occurring. However,
this effect has not been replicated and more research into this
particular factor is warranted.
Other evidence in support of this increased window of
temporal binding is found in studies that report an impairment
in time perception in people with schizophrenia (Elvevåg
et al., 2003; Franck et al., 2005). Patients with passivity
symptoms have been shown to exhibit aberrant cognitive
and motor timing. Particularly, these studies have shown that
these people perceive events as happening closer in time
than they actually occurred (Blakemore et al., 2000; Foucher
et al., 2007). This links to a related psychological phenomenon
called ‘‘intentional binding’’. Research conducted by Haggard
et al. (2002) shows that, when a voluntary action is followed
by an expected sensory consequence, a psychological binding
effect causes events to be perceived closer in time, which
contributes towards a sense of self-agency and self-recognition.
This intentional binding effect involves the subjective perception
that cause and effect are drawn together in perceived time
(Haggard et al., 2002). Subjective, intentional experience of
actions contributes to the inference of self-recognition (Haggard
et al., 2002; Haggard, 2005; Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007).
Outcome expectations, sensory feedback and causal beliefs
all partly influence binding (reviewed by Moore and Obhi,
2012).
Another phenomenon that is linked to the sense of agency is
sensory attenuation, in which the sensory consequences of self-
produced action are attenuated compared to externally generated
events (Blakemore et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005). Both
temporal binding and sensory attenuation can be modulated by
cognitive expectations about either the outcome or source of an
action (Moore et al., 2009; Desantis et al., 2011; Gentsch and
Schütz-Bosbach, 2011). When expectations about the outcome
of an action are induced in an experiment through showing the
action outcome before the actual action performance, stronger
temporal binding (Moore et al., 2009) and stronger sensory
attenuation (Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011) are reported.
In an extensive review, van der Weiden et al. (2015) show that
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia have impairments in
both motor prediction and cognitive processes (such as biased
expectation of actions), which may lead to over-attribution of
agency (see van der Weiden et al., 2015). In addition, research
conducted by Renes et al. (2013) shows that, when the outcome
of an action is implicitly primed, healthy people experience an
increased sense of agency over actions, whereas schizophrenic
patients do not (Renes et al., 2013).
The finding that the temporal binding window in
schizophrenia is altered has important implications. Precision
of internal timing is a crucial element in a variety of processes,
including self-recognition and sensory–motor awareness
(Haggard et al., 2003). Accurate temporal and intentional
binding is important in forming causal mental relationships.
This binding effect is thought to be modulated by top-down
processes associated with motor intentions, and subjective
experience of anticipated actions can therefore have distal
effects on sensory-motor perception. Expectation of actions
may thus also be involved bodily experience and ownership,
but the precise role of anticipatory mechanisms still needs to be
clarified.
PREDICTIVE MECHANISMS AND
ANTICIPATION
As discussed above, expectation of actions may also play an
important role in bodily experience. Additional evidence for
this comes from a study conducted by Ferri et al. (2014), who
created an edited version of the RHI in which they aimed to
measure illusion susceptibility in the absence of the multisensory
integration that occurs with the experience of touch. In this
experiment, participants were instructed to observe the hand
of the experimenter approaching, without touching, either a
rubber hand or a piece of wood placed on a table in front of
them. In healthy participants, expectation of touch due to the
sight of a hand approaching the rubber hand is sufficient to
elicit ownership over the rubber hand. Schizophrenia patients,
however, reported a much lower sense of ownership over the
rubber hand compared to healthy controls. Apparently, the
mere expectation of touch is not sufficient for patients to
experience the illusion. A possible explanation is that people with
schizophrenia anticipate touch in a different way than healthy
subjects do, or have a deficit in their predictive mechanisms of
action (Ferri et al. (2014).
Voss et al. (2010) recorded subjective time estimates of
a self-initiated voluntary action (a key press) followed by a
sensory effect (a tone). When the voluntary action had a
high probability of causing a tone, healthy volunteers showed
a predictive shift of the perceptual estimate of the action
towards the tone, whereas schizophrenia patients did not show
this effect. This indicates that patients may lack a predictive
component of action awareness. The deficit in predicting
the relationship between action and effect was correlated
with severity of positive psychotic symptoms, specifically
delusions and hallucinations. Furthermore, individuals with
schizophrenia showed an exaggerated retrospective binding
between action and tone (Voss et al., 2010). Other studies
also show impaired anticipation of the position of a moving
stimulus in schizophrenia with smooth pursuit eye movements
(e.g., Ross et al., 2000). Additionally, research on the Simon
effect, the finding that manual responses are faster and more
accurate when the stimulus appears on the same side as the
responding hand (Simon and Wolf, 1963), also suggests that
predictive mechanisms are dysfunctional in patients (Lalanne
et al., 2012).
EFFERENT MOTOR SIGNALS
In the static RHI only tactile, visual and proprioceptive
information are involved in evoking the feeling of ownership.
During passive movement, information from skin receptors,
muscle spindles, joint receptors and visual feedback provide
additional kinesthetic information (Edin and Johansson,
1995; Proske and Gandevia, 2012). In active movement, this
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information is accompanied by efferent information from
voluntary motor commands and the sensory predictions they
produce (Bays and Wolpert, 2007). This is described in the
‘‘forward model’’ (Frith et al., 2000), which proposes that the
sensory consequences of self-produced actions are predicted
using internal information, such as efference copies of a motor
command (Bell, 2001). By comparing the internal prediction
with the sensory afference, one can differentiate between
externally caused events and self-produced actions. In case
of a match between the different sources of information, the
salience of sensory information is diminished, and the afference
is interpreted as the result of a self-produced action. When
there is mismatch, the action is interpreted as being externally
caused (Synofzik et al., 2008). Attenuation of self-produced
stimulation occurs in healthy controls and psychotic patients
without passivity symptoms or auditory hallucinations. By
contrast, self-generated stimulation is not attenuated relative
to externally produced stimulation in patients with passivity
symptoms and/or auditory hallucinations (Blakemore et al.,
2002; Shergill et al., 2005). This would support the proposal
that such symptoms are associated with a deficit in the forward
mechanism that normally predicts and cancels out self-produced
actions.
During active movements, when efference information is
involved, recognition of a body part or action is enhanced in
healthy individuals (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2003;
MacDonald and Paus, 2003; Tsakiris et al., 2005; Nahab et al.,
2011). The importance of efferent signals and proprioception in
self-recognition was investigated by Haggard (2005) with a self-
recognition experiment in which healthy participants saw either
their own hand or the experiment’s through video feedback,
while their hand was passively moved either by the participants
own left hand (active movement) or by the experimenter
(passive movement). Participants were asked to judge whether
the hand was their own. During passive movement, with only
proprioceptive information available, self-recognition was at
chance level. With the added efferent information available,
when the participant actively made his own hand move,
performance in the self-recognition task significantly increased,
indicating that efferent information enhanced self-recognition
in this task. Shimada et al. (2009) showed that threshold for
the detection of mismatches (such as delayed visual feedback)
is indeed lower during passive movement, suggesting improved
discrimination ability when efferent information is available.
According to the authors, these results mean that efferent
signals give more important cues for self-recognition than just
proprioception.
Synofzik et al. (2010) examined whether lower performance
of schizophrenic patients in action attribution tasks is due to
inaccurate predictions about the sensory consequences of self-
produced action. Participants were asked to perform pointing
movements in a virtual-reality setup in which the visual feedback
of movements was rotated. Patients noticed the visual rotation
at a higher rotation angle compared to controls, and the size
of this angle was correlated to delusions of influence reported
in these patients. In a second experiment, participants had to
estimate their pointing direction in the presence of rotated video
feedback. Estimates done by patients were more influenced by
the feedback rotation and showed higher variability compared
to controls. Moreover, during trials without visual feedback, in
which estimates are completely dependent on internal action-
related signals, the variability in estimates was likewise increased.
These findings support the suggestion that the ‘‘comparator
mechanism’’, which relates internal and external cues (Frith,
2012), is impaired in schizophrenia due to elevated variation
in internal predictions about the sensory consequences of
action. Importantly, aside from greater variability in internal
predictions, external information about self-produced actions
(in this case visual feedback) influenced self-agency judgments
to a greater extent in patients. The weighting of internal
and external cues with respect to self-action may depend on
the reliability of internal predictions (Synofzik et al., 2010).
Imprecise or unreliable internal predictions may cause patients
to depend more strongly on external information on self-
action such as vision. This is in line with previous research
showing that schizophrenia patients with delusions of control
fail to make rapid error corrections based on awareness of
discrepancies between intended and predicted limb positions
(Malenka et al., 1982; Frith and Done, 1989), even though they
have no difficulty correcting errors based on visual feedback
about limb position (Frith and Done, 1989). This suggests that
individuals with schizophrenia are deficient in their ability to
monitor ongoing motor behavior on the basis of internal, self-
generated cues (Daprati et al., 1997; Blakemore et al., 2000,
2002).
Although studies on self-recognition have contributed to our
understanding of self-experience, these paradigms can provide
only indirect evidence for the role of sensory and efferent cues
in body ownership. The participant’s body-part is objectified
as it is presented as an external object, for example projected
on a screen (Tsakiris, 2010). The participant is asked to
judge whether the action or body part belongs to the self.
These experiments therefore involve explicit judgments rather
than the feeling of body ownership and agency (see also
Synofzik et al., 2008). Experimentation with the feeling of body-
ownership becomes possible when multisensory stimulation
is used to alter the experience of the body. The experience
of ownership of a body (part) can then be present in one
condition, and absent in another, as in the RHI (Tsakiris,
2010).
Tsakiris et al. (2006) studied the importance of efferent signals
in an adjusted version of the RHI in which the participants
performed both passive and active finger movements. With
passive movement, the feeling of ownership was specifically
localized to the moved finger. When actively moving a finger,
however, ownership expanded over the whole hand. This
suggests that efferent motor signals can integrate limbs into a
wider awareness of the body. The authors argue that efferent
motor signals enhance self-recognition by facilitating a ‘‘global
subjective awareness’’ of body parts. A purely proprioceptive
sense of body-ownership is local and fragmented, but the
motor sense of agency seems to integrate different body parts
into a coherent, global awareness of the body (Tsakiris et al.,
2006).
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In line with this, other studies have recently tried to examine
whether added signals from passive and active movement are
as important as visuo-tactile cues for developing a sense of
body ownership. Most of these studies compared the strength
of experiencing the RHI as elicited by active movements,
passive movements, or visuo-tactile stimulation. Conflicting
results have emerged from this research. Some studies indicate
that movement enhances body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2006;
Dummer et al., 2009), some report no differences between
movement and no-movement conditions (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2014) and another study suggest that movement decreases
ownership (Walsh et al., 2011). A recent study by Riemer
et al. (2013) found no difference in the subjective strength of
the ownership illusion when induced by active movements or
visuotactile stimulation. However, the study by Riemer et al.
(2013) found that the proprioceptive drift was stronger for the
actively moving RHI compared to the classical version. Kalckert
and Ehrsson (2012) reported higher subjective ownership ratings
during active movements compared to passive movements
(Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012).
An interesting finding of the study conducted by Kalckert
and Ehrsson (2014) was that, despite differences in available
sensory and motor information between the three induction
types, a very similar illusion was elicited. No differences were
found along the passive movement, active movement and visuo-
tactile stimulation conditions. This suggests that the RHI does
not depend on specific types of sensory signals. Rather, the
spatiotemporal relationship of the available signals seems to
be important (Ehrsson, 2012). More evidence emerges from
a study conducted Walsh et al. (2011), who used a moving
RHI and anaesthetized the finger with lidocaine, thereby
eliminating somatosensory information from the superficial
skin. Nevertheless, in this situation with only proprioceptive
and visual information available, participants experienced the
illusion of ownership (Walsh et al., 2011). It seems that
a match between any two independent sources of sensory
information such as visual and tactile information or correlated
sensorimotor signals can elicit the illusion. This explanation
emphasizes bottom-up mechanisms in the illusion, but does
not exclude top-down influences, which may pose a priori
constraints on the types of objects can become part of one’s own
body or may modulate the experience of ownership (Tsakiris
et al., 2010a; Petkova et al., 2011). Moreover, Kalckert and
Ehrsson (2014) found that active movements did not increase
strength of the illusion, which does not support the proposal
that efferent signals from voluntary motor commands are
important for experiencing ownership (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2014).
In order to understand how an enduring absence of
movement-related signals affects body ownership, Burin et al.
(2015) administered the classical RHI to a group of healthy
participants and to a group of neurological patients affected
by left upper limb hemiplegia without proprioceptive or tactile
deficits. Their results show that patients experienced a stronger
illusory effect when their left (affected) hand was stimulated,
but the illusion was absent when the right (unaffected) hand
was stimulated. This indicates that individuals with hemiplegia
have a weaker/more flexible sense of body ownership for
the affected hand, but an enhanced/more rigid one for the
healthy hand (Burin et al., 2015). A prolonged absence of
efferent signals may thus induce a more flexible sense of body
ownership.
Overall, at present there is no consensus on the extent
to which efferent signals contribute to the sense of body
ownership. The discrepancy in the results obtained in above
mentioned studies may be partly due to differences in the
setups (model hand and projected hand), types movements
that are used (full hand movements and finger movements)
and the measures for illusion strength. Some studies only used
proprioceptive drift (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 2009)
others only questionnaires (Dummer et al., 2009; Longo and
Haggard, 2009) or a combination of measures but obtained
discrepant results (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Riemer et al.,
2013). It is therefore not clear to what extent efferent signals
could contribute to the change in body ownership observed
in schizophrenia. Self-recognition paradigms have shown us
that individuals with schizophrenia exhibit elevated variation in
internal predictions about the sensory consequences of action.
Individuals with schizophrenia are deficient in their ability to
monitor ongoing motor behavior on the basis of internal, self-
generated cues (Blakemore et al., 2000, 2002). Moreover, external
information about self-produced actions (in this case visual
feedback) influences self-agency judgments to a greater extent
in schizophrenia patients (Synofzik et al., 2010). These studies
presented the participant’s body-part as an external object, for
example projected on a screen (Tsakiris, 2010). It would be
interesting to investigate the contribution of efferent signals to
ownership experience specifically with the use of themoving RHI
in schizophrenia.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SELF-AGENCY AND BODY OWNERSHIP
For a long time, it was thought that patients with schizophrenia
have a selective deficit in their sense of agency, whilst their
sense of body ownership would be intact. This links to the
idea that sense of agency and body-ownership are completely
distinct phenomena, without any shared component (Longo
et al., 2008). The model that stems from this view is termed the
‘‘independence model’’ (Tsakiris et al., 2010a). However, several
lines of evidence now indicate that there could be a relationship
between the sense of agency and body ownership. This idea is
reflected in the ‘‘additive model’’, in which the experience of
self- agency consists of the sense of body-ownership, plus the
added possible sense of voluntary control over actions (Longo
and Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2010a). In this view, the
sense of agency and body ownership are strongly related to each
other, and sense of agency is rooted in body ownership. Other
relationships between agency and ownership are also possible,
in which agency and ownership are dissociable components of
bodily experience but do interact. Agency is not a necessary
condition for body ownership as a sense of ownership over a
rubber hand can be elicited without movement, but perceived
non-agency may prevent ownership (Newport et al., 2010) while
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perceived agency may enhance the sense of body ownership
(Tsakiris et al., 2006).
In an experiment utilizing functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), Tsakiris et al. (2010a) investigated this
relationship between the sense of body ownership and agency.
They influenced the sense of body ownership by showing
either real-time or delayed visual feedback of movement,
whereas agency was manipulated through voluntary and passive
movement. As shown before, synchronous visual feedback can
cause body parts and bodily events to be attributed to oneself.
Thus, the condition producing body-ownership would follow
from passive movement with synchronous visual feedback, and
the condition with active movement and synchronous visual
feedback would result in a sense of agency. The additive model
predicts that the fMRI shows common activation in areas in
both the conditions that produce agency and body-ownership.
Secondly, there should also be additional activation of area(s)
for the condition producing agency. The independence model,
on the other hand, predicts that the brain contains different
networks for sense of body ownership and agency. Therefore,
there should be no common activation in conditions inducing
agency and ownership and distinct activations should be shown
in the agency condition that are not seen in the other conditions.
Also, specific activation should be seen in the condition of
ownership that is absent from the agency condition.
Interestingly, the results of the introspective data
(questionnaire) showed support of the additive model.
Subjects described significantly more feelings of agency in
the AS (active synchronous) condition, which causes a sense of
agency, compared to the three remaining conditions. Moreover,
participants reported stronger sense of body-ownership in
the AS condition compared to the passive synchronous (body
ownership) condition. This indicates that agency enhances the
sense of body ownership. The fMRI data, on the other hand,
showed support for the independence model. There was no
common activation in brain areas in the condition producing
both agency and body ownership. Also, both body-ownership
and agency showed different and exclusive activation of brain
areas, which provides evidence that different neural networks
underlie these experiences. Tsakiris et al. (2010a) postulate that
the discrepancy between neural activation and questionnaire
data indicates that conscious experience and brain activity
cannot be mapped one-to-one. Alternatively, this result may
reveal a limitation of introspective data.
In an earlier study, Marcel (2003) differentiated between
attribution of an action to one’s self, and attribution of the
intention of the action to one’s self. For example, patients with
an anarchic hand report the distinct sense of their involuntary
movements as being their own, but they do not experience
intending these movements. They do not have a feeling of
agency, whilst they continue to experience body ownership
(Marcel, 2003). Also, recognizing actions as one’s own requires
an explicit judgment, contrary to the experience of an action as
being one’s own. Introspective data may not properly distinguish
the difference between ownership of intentional action and
ownership of more general bodily actions and sensations
(Tsakiris et al., 2010a). The reverse dissociation, in which people
retain a sense of agency, but not body ownership, is harder
to envisage. As Tsakiris et al. (2010a) point out, however,
this can be seen in anosognosia patients with hemiplegia
who also have somatoparaphrenic delusions. When a patient
looks at her arm she would report that the arm belongs to
another person. Nevertheless, the patient denies paralysis and
describes that she is able to move her arm voluntarily, which
indicates awareness of self-agency (Fotopoulou et al., 2008).
This may indicate a double dissociation between agency and
ownership.
On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that
the sense self-agency and body ownership are interacting and
overlapping rather than modular and discrete (Legrand, 2006;
Synofzik et al., 2008). Action processes that contribute to a sense
of agency depend on processes involved in body ownership, such
as multisensory integration and internal body representations
(Waters and Badcock, 2010). Lower performance on attribution
tasks in people with schizophrenia have often been brought up
as evidence for a selective dysfunction in sense of agency (Franck
et al., 2001). It has been argued, however, that performance on
these tasks, in which subjects have to judge whether a movement
belongs to oneself based on visual feedback, requires ‘‘an implicit
knowledge of one’s body as a sensory object that is moving
(i.e., a sense of body ownership)’’ (Waters and Badcock, 2010).
This means that attribution errors may partly be caused by a
distortion in sense of body ownership. Moreover, deficits in
integrating visual and somatosensory signals from limbs have
been shown to affect the ability to judge self-action (Bulot et al.,
2007).
Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) used a version of the RHI
in which they systematically varied the relative timing of the
finger movements (synchronous vs. asynchronous), the mode
of movement (active vs. passive), and the position of the model
hand (anatomically congruent vs. incongruent positions). Their
results indicate that voluntary finger movements elicit a robust
illusion of owning the rubber hand. Asynchrony eliminated both
ownership and agency, passive movements selectively eliminated
the sense of agency, and incongruent positioning diminished
ownership but not agency. These findings provide evidence
for a double dissociation of ownership and agency. However,
the authors also note that the sense of agency was stronger
when the hand was perceived to be part of the participant’s
body, and in this condition a significant correlation between
agency and ownership was found. A later study by Kalckert and
Ehrsson (2014) reported that questionnaire ratings of ownership
and agency were correlated across individuals, even in the
passive versions of the illusion (passive movement and visuo-
tactile). This result suggests that ownership modulates agency
and produces a weak tendency for agency even in the absence
of intentions and voluntary motor commands (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2014).
Garbarini et al. (2016) showed that people with schizophrenia
exhibit a greater interference of visual information about the
movements of another person on their sense of agency. The
authors administered two versions of a manual drawing task
to 20 schizophrenic patients and 20 age-matched healthy
controls. In the bimanual version, participants had to draw
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lines with one hand and circles with the other. In the
modified version, participants were instructed to draw lines
while observing the examiner drawing circles from a first person
perspective. In the bimanual version, patients and controls
showed a comparable interference effect. In the observation
version, however, schizophrenics showed a significantly greater
interference the examiners’ hand drawing circles on their own
hand drawing lines. This effect was significantly correlated
to the strength of the positive symptoms (hallucinations and
delusions) and to the sense of agency that was reported during
the task. These findings suggest that an altered sense of agency
can induce changes in the motor system. However, there
was no correlation between motor performance and feeling
of ownership over the experimenter’s hand (Garbarini et al.,
2016).
Louzolo et al. (2015) used the version of the RHI that
is based on finger movements rather than tactile stimulation
(Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014) to investigate the relationship
between delusion-proneness and sense of agency. Individuals
with a high delusion-proneness score gave equally strong
agency ratings in active and passive conditions, suggesting that
they experienced both conditions as self-produced (Louzolo
et al., 2015). This may imply that delusion-prone individuals
experience agency in the absence of motor intentions possibly
due to increased reliance on external sensory signals, in this
case vision. This was also reflected in the ownership scores.
These results are in line with the idea that motor prediction
is weakened (Blakemore et al., 2000; Blakemore and Frith,
2003; Shergill et al., 2005; Teufel et al., 2010) whereas external
cues become more salient (Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al.,
2010) in delusion-prone individuals. Hypersalient processing of
both agency and ownership cues might be related to failures
of self-recognition in schizophrenia (Waters and Badcock,
2010).
To summarize, the relationship between agency and
ownership remains elusive. A double dissociation between
the sense of agency and body ownership may exist, but more
research on this subject in schizophrenia is warranted. Rather,
phenomenological studies indicate that patients have distortions
in the sense of self beyond only action awareness, extending
over a broad area of self-experience, including the sense of
body ownership. Previous studies with healthy participants and
neurological patients suggest that agency and body ownership
are dissociable to some extent, but also interact with agency
affecting ownership and vice versa. Studies indicate that agency
and ownership are dissociable elements of self-experience.
However, evidence from healthy individuals also suggests that
the sense of agency and ownership interact. The disturbed
sense of agency in schizophrenia may therefore contribute to a
disturbed sense of body ownership. Further experimental studies
are necessary to disentangle agency and body ownership related
problems in schizophrenia.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have reviewed the various sources of
information that may contribute to a coherent sense of body
ownership. It is thought that bodily experience is the result of
a complex integration of both bottom-up sensory processes and
higher order, top-down bodily and perceptual representations.
Bodily experience involves the integration of multisensory
information. Ownership is enhanced by visual capture of
proprioceptive information on limb position. In order to infer
body ownership, people with schizophrenia rely to a greater
extent on external stimuli, such as visual information, that
override weaker stored body representations. In addition, the
temporal and intentional binding window seem to be altered
in people with schizophrenia. This effect of temporal binding is
thought to be modulated by top-down processes associated with
motor intentions. Moreover, predictive, re-afferent information
on the spatial position of body parts is related to increased
sense of agency and ownership (Giummarra et al., 2008). We
have also discussed evidence for a disturbance in predictive
mechanisms that normally allow for anticipation of upcoming
events.
The evidence presented in this review indicates that people
with schizophrenia have higher variability in internal predictions
about the sensory consequences of action. Importantly, aside
from internal predictions, additional external information about
self-produced actions influences self-agency judgments to a
greater extent. The weighting of internal and external cues
with respect to self-action may depend on the reliability
of internal predictions (Synofzik et al., 2010). Imprecise or
unreliable internal predictions might cause patients to depend
more strongly on external information on self-action such as
vision. People with schizophrenia and individuals with elevated
psychosis-prone characteristics (Teufel et al., 2010), show
reduced susceptibility to perceptual illusions, a phenomenon
driven by prior expectations (reviewed inNotredame et al., 2014).
The abnormalities in low-level processing that are observed
in schizophrenia may indicate imprecise prior beliefs (Denève
and Jardri, 2016). A possible mechanism could involve the
capacity of higher-order areas to predict the state of lower
level representations (sensory, motor, or cognitive). This is
described in the predictive coding framework (Friston and
Kiebel, 2009). The Bayesian model of schizophrenia proposes
that stronger aberrant signals may contribute to even more
imprecise expectations which may influence belief formation,
which eventually results in delusions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Denève and Jardri, 2016). Imprecise or weaker predictions
may result in increased salience of external cues due to a
lack of suppression of the input signals. Alternatively, aberrant
or hypersalient input signals may prevent establishment of
stable low-level predictions (Schmack et al., 2013). Further
examinations into the interaction between higher order cognitive
processes and sensory-motor processes could prove to be crucial
for understanding abnormal self-experience in schizophrenia.
In an extensive review, van der Weiden et al. (2015) show
that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia have impairments
in both motor prediction and cognitive processes, such
as biased expectation of actions (van der Weiden et al.,
2015).
We have provided arguments against the prevailing idea
that people with schizophrenia have a selective deficit in the
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sense of agency. Even though concepts of agency and ownership
can be dissociated to some extent, there is also evidence to
suggest that the sense of agency and body ownership are
interconnected. Evidence for this in healthy participants comes
from a study conducted by Tsakiris et al. (2006). During
active finger movement, the RHI extended to the whole hand.
A purely proprioceptive sense of body-ownership is local
and fragmented, but the motor sense of agency integrates
different body parts into a coherent, global awareness of
the body (Tsakiris et al., 2006). Other studies in healthy
participants indicate that people are more likely to experience
an external object as part of their body when they have active
control over the object. Agency and ownership seem to be
dissociable yet interacting, but there is no consensus on this
topic yet.
In summary, studies so far show that individuals with
schizophrenia have a disturbed sense of body ownership.
This review discussed several factors that may contribute.
They include deficits in multisensory integration, a weaker
stored representation of the body, differences in temporal
binding as well as impairments in predicting sensory
consequences of efferent motor signals. The latter is particularly
relevant for the reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia
patients. While agency has been considered to be separate
from the sense of body ownership, recent studies with
healthy participants suggest that they are linked and that
an enhanced sense of agency increases feelings of body
ownership. The reduced sense of agency in schizophrenic
patients may therefore be one of the contributing factors
with regards to the disturbed sense of body ownership.
Vice versa, a reduced sense of body ownership may also
contribute to a reduced sense of agency. Future studies
should explicitly target the precise relation between the two in
schizophrenia.
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